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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

TAX CLAUSES FOR PENNSYLVANIA DECEDENTS
By
JOHN

E. WILLIAMS

PART I-INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Estate Tax Apportionment Act of 1951 (P.L. 1405)
by the General Assembly of Pennsylvania was a recognition of the importance of
adequate provisions for the burden of death taxes.
Although our Pennsylvania apportionment law was modernized and improved
by the 1951 Act, it was expressly made effective only where the decedent does not
himself provide for the source of payment of death taxes. Definite and comprehensive provisions made by the decedent are as much to be preferred in dealing with
death taxes as in providing for distribution of that part of the estate remaining
after taxes. An inadequate testamentary provision for taxes is to be avoided as
much as any other partial intestacy.
Death taxes, by and large, consume approximately 25% of the net estates
administered by a metropolitan trust company. Provisions for administering and
eventually distributing the 75 % or less of corpus remaining after payment of taxes
may fill page after page of the will or trust deed, but the tax clause will sometimes be confined to a stock paragraph of only a few lines, and yet is supposed to
govern the disposition of 25% or more of the corpus of an estate.

The writer has struggled with so many and such a variety of provisions for
payment of death taxes that an analysis of the good and the bad has been inevitable. Regardless of what may follow as a suggestion for comprehensive coverage of the matter, the fact remains that provisions for payment of death taxes
should be most carefully tailor-made to accomplish the exact result that the testator or settlor would desire.
Let us try to separate the provision for taxes into several parts, to assist in
the over-all analysis:
A. Should the provision "direct" or merely "authorize"?
B. To whom is the provision directed?
C. What types of taxes are to be covered?
D. Are interest and penalties included?
E. What types of property are covered?
*Assistant vice president, Provident Trust Company of Philadelphia; A.B., Princeton University;
certified pulbic accountant, District of Columbia; member of Executive Committee and chairman
of Committee on Legislation, Bank and Trust Company Tax Association of Philadelphia; member
of Legislative Committee, Union League Tax Group, Philadelphia; member, Committees on Taxation,
Trust Sections, American Bankers Association and Pennsylvania Bankers Association.
(Editor's Note: The author wishes to express appreciation to John T. Macartney, Esquire, of
the Philadelphia Bar for his guidance in respect to legal terminology and citations.)
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F. When are the taxes to be paid?
G. Where shall the burden of taxes fall?
H. Miscellaneous comments.
The material for this article is arranged under five general headings:
Part 1. This introduction.
Part 2. Comments on the parts, A to G above, that make up the
whole of a tax clause.
Part 3. A suggested comprehensive tax dause.
Part 4. Index by subject-matter and digests of certain illustrative
decisions, keyed to parts C to G of the tax clause.
Part 5. Alphabetical index of decisions digested.
PART 2-COMMENTS ON THE PARTS OF TAX CLAUSES
A. A direction to pay death taxes from a designated source, such as the residue or general principal, is to be preferred over a mere authorization. The personal representative should not be asked to use any discretion as to the source
of funds for taxes. It would not be conducive to harmony with the heirs if there
was an option granted to the executor to shift the incidence of tax liability from
one fund to another. Judge Hunter in his booklet, "Forms of Wills in Pennsylvania" (Second Edition), begins his provision for taxes "I direct...."
There may be an exception to the above when drafting tax provisions for
an inter vivos deed of trust, as in the situation where the liquid assets in the testamentary estate may not be sufficient for legacies, debts, administration expenses
and death taxes, and the trustee of the inter vivos trust is given some latitude in
furnishing financial aid to the testamentary estate, to avoid an insolvency or to
prevent the forced sale of non-liquid testamentary assets. One form of "aid" is
as follows:
Upon the death of Settlor, should his individual estate, exclusive
of real estate and personal effects, be insufficient to pay his debts, funeral expenses and the'taxes and expenses in connection with the settlement of his estate, Trustee is hereby authorized to pay out of the principal of this Trust such of said debts, taxes and expenses as Trustee, in its
sole discretion, may deem proper and desirable to be paid; but such
claims shall not be enforceable against Trustee by reason of this provision.
B. Sometimes the direction to pay taxes is set forth without mentioning the
executor or trustee. There should be no difficulty with such an omission. The
provisions of the will live on through the executorship and trusteeship. However,
fault can be found in provisions that mention only the executor, and part or all of
the estate is to be held in a trust. Taken at its face value a direction to the executor alone to pay taxes might necessitate the holding in the executorship of a
substantial reserve against unascertained tax liabilities, instead of permitting the
executorship to be closed and the residuary trust to be set up, with authority to
pay any additional death taxes found to be due.
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Furthermore, if only the executor is directed to pay taxes and given discretion to prepay or postpone taxes on future or remainder interests, there sometimes
are difficulties where the first life tenant is a direct heir, with the life estate taxable at 2% in Pennsylvania, while the succeeding life tenant and remainderman
are collaterals, taxable at the higher rate. Assume that the executor, to conserve
principal and therefore income for the first life tenant, pays the 2% tax only on
the value of the first life estate. Later, the first life tenant dies and the trustee cannot find authority in the will permitting him as trustee to pay the collateral tax
on the entire value of the fund, but must pay tht collateral tax only on the value
of the succeeding beneficiary's life estate, and still later when that life tenant dies,
pay a third tax on the entire value of the corpus then distributable to the remainderman.
If the will creates a trust of the residue, directions to pay and authorizations
to prepay should not be restricted to the executor, but should include the trustee
as well.
C. Next, the types of taxes should be considered. Taxes due by reason of
death are known by various names: estate taxes, inheritance taxes, transfer taxes,
succession taxes, death duties, etc. "All death taxes due by reason of my death"
would be a short form. "All death taxes" by itself might raise some question as
to federal or state estate taxes payable on death of a donee of a power of appointment, levied actually as to the estate of the donee of the power. "Due by reason
of my death" is not quite satisfactory, for instance, in its application to Pennsylvania inheritance tax, since the tax on a successive life estate or remainder is not
"due" at the testator's death. The following is suggested for accuracy and completeness: "Any and all inheritance, estate, succession and other death taxes, of
whatever nature and by whatever jurisdiction imposed, assessed against my estate
or payable by reason of my death."
D. There is a trend toward including interest and penalties in provisions for
taxes. Certainly the provision should be sp'ecific and not leave anything to doubt.
Most tax men have seen cases of real hardship, where the income of trusts has
been charged with substantial interest on deficiency tax assessments of large
amounts, reducing or eliminating distributable income of life tenants for many
months, a result probably never intended by the testator. The earlier court decisions applicable to Pennsylvania decedents charged interest on tax deficiencies
against the income of estates or trusts. Comm. v. Pearson, 154 F.2d 256; Penrose v. U. S., 18 F. Supp. 413.
The rate of interest on federal estate tax and Pennsylvania inheritance tax
is 6%, as against a present average net rate of return of 31/2% to 4% for normal trust investments. Six percent interest is, therefore, at least partly a penalty
and is not normally incurred except for good and sufficient reasons having to do
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with the compromise or negotiated settlements of contested tax liabilities. The
more recent court decisions have. treated interest as part of the tax and chargeable to principal, with apportionment against various principal funds where applicable. The Principal and Income Act of 1947 (P.L. 1283) in Section 11 (4)
provided that "Interest and Penalties on inheritance and estate taxes, levied by
any authority Federal, State or foreign, shall be paid out of principal to the extent
that such interest and penalties are in excess of the rate of return which has been
or shall be realized from the estate during the time such interest and penalty have
accrued." Difficulties developed in working out the formula for "th-e rate of return." See "Notes on the Estate Tax Apportionment Act of 1951," Dickinson
Law Review, January, 1952. The Estate Tax Apportionment Act of 1951 (P.L.
1405) repealed Section 11 (4) of the Principal and Income Act of 1951 insofar
as it was inconsistent with the provisions of the Estate Tax Apportionment Act of
1951 and instead provided (Section 3 b) that taxes "including interest and penalties shall be paid entirely from principal." The Estate Tax Apportionment Act
of 1951 does not apply, at least as to taxes, for estates or trusts functioning under instruments containing adequate instructions for payment of taxes. Where
the provision for taxes in a will or deed of trust is silent as to interest, the position might be taken that the Estate Tax Apportionment Act of 1951 governs
as to interest and penalties on federal estate tax and they should "be paid entirely from principal" (Section 3 b). The aforesaid act, however, has no application to Pennsylvania inheritance tax, Pennsylvania estate tax, or death taxes of
other states. Therefore, as has been said above, it would be well to have a specific
provision that interest and penalties are to be paid from principal.
E. Next for consideration is the question as to what types of property should
be embraced by the tax provisions. A testator or settlor may not wish his executor or trustee to pay taxes in respect to "outside" interests (i.e., assets the disposition of which is not controlled by the instrument). On the other hand the testator or settlor may wish to have the outside assets freed of any liability for taxes.
There are many gradations between restricted coverage and complete coverage.
Trouble is often encountered where the draftsman has tried to particularize, for
instance by reference to "property owned jointly by my wife and myself, and proceeds of insurance policies payable in installments to my wife." At the time the
will is drafted, and on the basis of such information as is furnished by the testator,
the coverage appears adequate and the designation clear. But time and time again,
when the will is probated, the type of asset has changed or other types have been
added, and the provision for taxes is found inadequate to cover other taxable
assets such as United States bonds payable on death to the wife, or proceeds of insurance to be held by the life insurance company with only interest payable to the
wife and without right of commutation. It can be safely said that most attempts to
particularize the items to be free of taxes result in difficulties of construction and
embarrassment for the draftsman.
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Therefore, it is generally better practice to limit the coverage of taxes to
the assets held under the instrument, or to provide complete coverage for "any
and all property, life insurance and other interests comprising my estate for
death tax purposes." It should be understood, however, that the complete coverage
must be used with discretion, after due consideration of powers of appointment,
inter vivos transfers and the like, which might be brought into the taxable estate
for death tax purposes. Then, too, the size of the estate that is expected to bear
the death taxes must be considered. The writer has in mind a will now being administered where the entire residue did not amount to $50,000 and the draftsman had
used the broadest form of tax provision, though the taxable estate including inter
vivos transfers ran into seven figures and the federal estate tax itself was six times
the amount of the residue of the testamentary estate. The draftsman of the will adrnitted that the broad form of tax coverage in the will was inappropriate.
F. It is wise to give one's executors and trustees permission both to prepay or
defer the payment of taxes, in order to effect the best possible result. Without
discretion as to deferment, it might work a hardship on the primary beneficiary
as to Pennsylvania inheritance tax on remainders, which tax might run as high as
15 %. Also, in some situations, it is desirable to postpone the payment of federal
estate tax, under Internal Revenue Code, Section 925, as to reversionary or remainder
interests. On the other hand, it may be advisable to prepay the Pennsylvania inheritance tax on remainders. Therefore permission should be given to pay the death
taxes "at such time or times as my Executors or Trustees shall deem advisable."
G. The use of a tax clause in a will or deed of trust normally indicates
the intention that the taxes are to b'e paid from the general principal of the residuary estate. However, the draftsman should not stop there, because the residuary principal itself may pass to different classes of heirs (part to exempt charities and part
to individuals, for federal estate tax; and part to direct heirs and part to collateral
heirs for Pennsylvania inheritance tax). Directing payment of taxes "as if such taxes
were administration expenses" would seem to eliminate any difficulty in construction at this point. But in many cases the payment of Pennsylvania inheritance tax
on remainder interests may be deferred and part of the residue may become distributable long before the other part. Does the testator or settlor wish to have a tax
reserve withheld from the first share of residue that becomes distributable? The
answer should be "no" in practically every case. Suppose the draftsman is preparing
a will for a man whose family is composed of his wife, his married son with two
children, and his married daughter with no children. His wife is to receive income
from the residuary estate for her life, and then the trust is divided in two parts,
one to pay income to the son with complete distribution of principal at age 35. The
other part is to pay income to the daughter for her life and then income to the
son-in-law for his life and principal is distributable to other collaterals on death of

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

VOL. 57

the son-in-law. The testator dies; later his widow dies; and later the son becomcs
35 and is entitled to receive principal. The 2% tax has been paid on the widow's
life estate, the son's half, and the daughter's life estate in her half. However, at
the daughter's death the collateral tax at 151% will be due, on values that cannot be
determined until the daughter dies. If all taxes are to be paid from residuary principal, it would seem that a reserve must be set up from the son's outgoing share, to
pay a half share of the collateral tax on the life estate of the son-in-law and, later,
a half share of the collateral tax on the remainder interests. A reserve against the
son's share would not tend to increase family harmony as between the son and the
son-in-law, and the testator probably would not want such a result. Therefore, the
tax clause should provide for payment of taxes from the then general principal.
This example is set forth in detail because there are many similar situations, even
involving only direct heirs and the 2% Pennsylvania inheritance tax, where a portion of residue becomes distributable with all its tax paid, but with remainder taxes still to be paid on other portions of residue.
PART 3 - A SUGGESTED COMPREHENSIVE TAX CLAUSE
I direct that any and all inheritance, estate, succession and other death taxes,
of whatever nature and by whatever jurisdiction imposed, and interest and penalties in respect thereto, assessed against my estate or payable by reason of my
death with respect to any and all property, life insurance and other interests comprising my estate for death tax purposes, whether or not such property or interest
passes under this my will or any codicil thereto, shall not be apportioned but shall
be paid without reimbursement, as if such taxes were administration expenses, at
such time or times as my Executors or Trustees shall deem advisable, from the then
general principal of my residuary estate or trust, except to the extent that such payment shall be relieved by payment from other sources made pursuant to a direction
or authorization in any trust under deed created by me.
PART 4-INDEX BY SUBJECT MATTER AND DIGESTS OF CERTAIN
ILLUSTRATIVE DECISIONS
C. The types of taxes to be covered by the tax clause should be specified. Unless
the tax clause is definite on this point, questions of interpretation may arise as to:
Personal Property Tax (Magee Estate and Rieger Estate, Digests # 1 and

#2).
Federal Income Tax (Williamson Estate and Nevil Estate, Digests #3

and #4).
Inheritance and/or Estate Tax (Harvey Estate, Prifer Estate and Lucey
Estate, Digests #5, 6 & 7).
Direct and Collateral Inheritance Tax (Wheeler Estate, Digest #8).
"Taxes for the first year" (Taylor Estate, Digest #9).
Magee Estate, 205 Pa. 37 (1903), Digest #1
The testator directed that "all taxes, federal and state, upon the bequests made and legacies created in my will, and the codicils thereto, shall be
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paid out of my estate, and not deducted from such bequests or legacies." Fifty
thousand dollars was left in trust for the trustee to invest "and pay over the income thereof to

. .

." The trustee and beneficiary asked for an additional amount

to be set aside sufficient to pay any tax accruing thereafter on the legacy as "money
at interest," so that the income would be protected from diminution by taxes during
the whole period of the trust. The court held against the appellants, referring to
their plea as "a very strained construction, not within the natural meaning of the
words or any apparent intent of the testator."
Rieger Estate, 61 Montg. 104 (1945), Digest #2
The will provided that inheritance taxes and all taxes of "any kind" were to
be paid from the residue. It was held that the residuary principal should be
charged with personal property taxes on investments as well as any future taxes
imposed on any part of the estate.
Williamson Estate, 61 Montg. 242 (1945), Digest #3
The will provided for an annuity of $8,000 for the testator's wife "net and
free from all liability for taxes, or charges of any character, which said taxes or
other charges, if any, shall be payable out of my residuary estate." The decision held
that each year there should be ascertained "the amount of income tax imposed on
her whole income that is allocable to this $8,000, and pay that sum so imposed in
the first instance and that sum alone, in addition to the total of $8,000." There is
no reference in the decision to the additional income tax payable by the widow
in respect to the tax money on the $8,000 and it must be assumed that she would
have to bear that much of the additional income tax.
Nevil Estate, 367 Pa. 30 (1951), Digest #4
The annuitant, sixteen years after the testatrix died and the annuity began,
sought to have federal income tax on her $84,000 annuity paid by the trustee. The
tax clause read: "All the bequests, legacies and devises herein contained are to be
free from any and all taxes lawfully imposed or to be imposed by the United States
government or any state government or any municipal authority thereof, which taxes
are to be paid by my estate." This claim had not been made at the filing of two
previous trustees' accountings in 1935 and 1939. The court commented on the
"multiplicity of factors" that affect federal income tax, such as medical expenses,
charitable deductions, marital status, casualty losses, exemptions, changing rates,
etc., and held that to embrace federal income tax, the wording of a will would have
to be "much more explicit and indubitably clear than the phraseology which this
testator employed." Magee Estate, 205 Pa. 37 (1903), was cited with approval. A
dissenting opinion was filed by Mr. Justice Ladner, with references to Pennsylvania
decisions involving income taxes in a deed reserving a ground rent and in a lease,
and with a citation of In Re Pflomm, 241 N.Y. 513, where the words "any and
all" in a will were construed as including income taxes. Mr. Chief Justice Drew
joined in the dissent.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

VOL. 57

Harvey Estate, 350 Pa. 53 (1944), Digest #5
Pecuniary legacies aggregating $235,000 from an estate valued at more than
$2,000,000 were "subject to the payment of the Pennsylvania State Inh'eritance
Tax." The will had been executed in 1936, before the passage of the Pennsylvania Apportionment Act of 1937. Taxes on specific legacies were to be paid from
residue, but it was held that the pecuniary legacies "subject to ... State Inheritance
Tax" were also subject to proration of federal estate tax.
Prifer Estate, 53 D. & C. 103 (0. C. Of
Schuylkill County, 1945), Digest #6
The tax provision read, "I direct that any estate, transfer, inheritance or succession tax or taxes which may be due and payable shall be paid out of the residuary
of my estate and that the legatee named shall receive his legacy free and clear of
such tax or taxes." Extra-testamentary property included United States bonds, both
"payable on death" to others, and joint with others; life insurance, and an annuity
contract. The court held that all the federal estate tax was payable from the residuary
estate, but the beneficiaries of extra-testamentary taxable property must pay their
own inheritance taxes. The decision stressed the fact that the testamentary estate is
primarily liable for the federal estate tax which is assessed against the estate, while
Pennsylvania inheritance tax is primarily due by the beneficiaries of an estate or of
an extra-testamentary gift. The wording "the legatee named shall receive his
legacy free and clear of such tax or taxes" drew the attention of the judge, and
was taken to indicate that other beneficiaries (of extra-testamentary gifts), not
being mentioned were not covered as to inheritance tax. This judicial asquiescence
in expressio unius est exclusio alterius may be contrasted with the failure to mention
the "so that" clause in Brown's Will (Digest #25).
Lacey Estate, 63 D. & C. 645 (0. C. Of
Phila. County, 1948), Digest #7
The will contained the sentence "Eighth, I direct that all inheritance, succession or transfer tax or taxes in the nature thereof, be deducted from my residuary
estate before or at the time of the settlement of my executors' account of the administration." The Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County en banc held that the
provision for taxes did not extend to life insurance or an inter vivos trust included
in the gross estate for federal estate tax. The decision mentioned that the tax
clause did not mention federal taxes either by name or description and that "inheritance, succession or transfer" taxes are customarily understood to mean state
taxes imposed on the beneficiaries, whereas the federal estate tax is a tax imposed
on the net estate. In the Lucey will, there was no reference to taxes imposed on the
estate as such.
Wheelei Estate, 25 Erie 113 (1943), Digest #8
The testator had provided for direct inheritance tax as follows: "I also order
and direct that all direct inheritance taxes chargeable against any legacies or be-
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quests herein contained shall be paid out of my estate." The judge noted that the
will had been drafted by the decendent's attorneys, and ruled that only direct and
not collateral inheritance taxes should be paid out of the general estate, except where
collateral inheritance tax was otherwise specifically provided for from residue.
Taylor Estate, 48 D. & C. 456 (0. C. Of
Phila. County, 1943), Digest #9
A question was raised as to construction of the following provision: "It is
my order and direction that the taxes for the first year following my death shall
be paid out of my residuary estate." The question was whether Pennsylvania inheritance taxes were covered. It was decided that inheritance taxes were not covered;
that the provision referred to taxes that recur annually, "that is, taxes upon the
real estate owned by testatrix." The court suggested that personal property taxes
would also be covered, but no decision was required on this point, inasmuch as
such taxes would be payable from income, there was no accounting of income before
(he court, and the result would be the same in reducing the distributive share of
the residuary legatees.
D. For the reasons set forth in Part 2-D above, and to prevent controversy,
the tax clause should provide for the payment of interest and penalties.
Widener Estate, 1 Fid. Rep. 126 (0. C. Of
Montg. County, 1951), Digest #10
The will had the following tax provision: "I direct that all estate, transfer,
inheritance and like taxes shall be paid out of the principal of my residuary
estate

. .

." A portion of an inter vivos trust created by the decedent was included

in the gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. The court held that all federal
estate tax should be paid from residuary principal of the testamentary estate, with
no proration against the inter vivos trust. The inter vivos trust contained no provision for death taxes. The judge noted that the testamentary provision for taxes was
not restricted by familiar terms such as "imposed upon my 'estate" or "upon the
estate passing under my will." Interest of $180,730.02 on deficiencies in state and
federal taxes was directed to be paid wholly from principal of the residuary estate
on the authority of Mellon Est., 347 Pa. 520, where penalty interest was held to be
part of the tax.
E. There has been much litigation as to whether certain tax clauses cover
extra-testamentary property, and even whether a tax clause in the will covers
a legacy in a codicil or vice versa. The coverage of the tax clause should be free
from doubt, to prevent controversies such as the following:
"Legacies" or "bequests" or property "passing under my will" did not
include extra-testamentary property. Lamberton Estate, Moreland Estate, Kyle Estate, Stadfelt Estate, Knight Trust and Rice
Estate. (Digests 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16).
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Tax clause in will covered codicil. Miller Estate and Thompson Estate.
(Digests 17 and 18).
Tax clause in codicil coveted will. Spangenberg Estate. (Digest 19).
Tax clause in codicil did not cover will. Henlein Estate. (Digest #44).
Tax clause in both the will and a deed of trust. Cunningham Estate. (Digest 20).
"Taxes of any kind, including.., my wife's interest" did not limit coverage to wife's interest. Anderson Estate. (Digest 21).
"All taxes" or "estate" given broad interpretation. Crooks Estate, Slattery
Estate, Williamson Estate, Brown Estate, Stoeckel Estate, York
Estate, Widener Estate and (part) Ely Estate. (Digests 22, 23,
24, 25, 26, 27, 10 and 28).
"All taxes" or similar phraseology not given broad interpretation. Ely
Estate (part), Reed Estate, Glatfelter Estate and Lucey Estate.
(Digests 28, 29, 30 and 7).
U. S. Savings bonds registered "(decedent) or Miss.. ." covered by tax
clause because bonds were a part of decedent's estate at the
moment of his death. Evans Estate. (Digest 31).
Tax clause in will covered extra-testamentary property for federal estate
tax but not for Pennsylvania inheritance tax. PriferEstate. (Digest 6).
"Free and clear of ... tax"-position in sentence raised doubt as to what
was covered. Wood Estate. (Digest 32).
Was a provision in the will a satisfaction of a debt, or a legacy covered by
the tax clause? Miles Estate. (Digest 33).
Additional bequest covered by tax exemption expressed for first bequest.
Croxton Estate. (Digest 34).
Direction to convert residue into cash and to pay proceeds after taxes and
costs did not cover taxes on bequests and devises in codicil.
Rettew Estate. (Digest 35).
Life tenant held not a devisee or legatee and not chargeable with a share of
federal estate tax (but chargeable with Pennsylvania inheritance
tax) where will directed that proportionate taxes should be
charged against each legatee and devisee. Wyndham Estate.
(Digest 36).
Lamberton Estate, 41 D. & C. 192 (0. C. Of
Erie County, 1940), Digest #11
The brief provisions for taxes were held not to apply to joint property passing by survivorship to the decedent's daughter. The will contained the following:
"This and all legacies herein shall be free of tax" and later "All legacies herein are
to be free of tax." Since the property passing by survivorship did not qualify as a
legacy under the will, the survivor was required to pay her Pennsylvania inheritance
tax and a share of the federal estate tax.
Moreland Estate, 351 Pa. 623 (1945), Digest #12
It was held that a provision freeing bequests from taxes did not apply to
extra-testamentary property. The testator had directed that "each and every bequest
made by me in this my last will and testament shall be free and clear of any and all
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Federal Inheritance Tax and free and clear of any and all Pennsylvania Collateral
Inheritance Tax." The court also held that portions of death taxes prorated to extratestamentary assets may be collected from legacies under the will passing to the
same individuals as receive the extra-testamentary interests, in spite of the abovequoted provision.
Kyle Estate, 1 Fid. Rep. 131 (0. C. Of

Phila. County, 1947), Digest #13
The testatrix had provided as follows: "I direct that my Executor pay out of
the principal of my residuary estate any and all estate, inheritance, legacy or succession taxes, it being my intention that all legacies herein given shall be without
deduction for any such tax or taxes." The testatrix had created two "tentative"
trusts of savings funds, in trust for Madelene Hutt who was also a beneficiary
of the residuary testamentary estate. The decision held that both Pennsylvania Inheritance Tax and a share of federal estate tax should be charged against Madelene
Hutt on account of her receipt of the saving fund accounts. Judge Hunter noted
that the tax clause referred to "any and all" death taxes, but based his decision on
the limitation, "it being my intention that all legacies herein given shall be without
deduction for any such tax or taxes." (Emphasis supplied.) He distinguished the
tax clause in the present will from those where the disjunctive is used, such as
"imposed upon my estate or any part thereof or any estate or any interest herein
given." One sentence in Judge Hunter's opinion is worthy of particular emphasis
for the purpose of this paper: "Any testator by simple language can make his intention clear, and he should be required to do so."
Stadtfelt Estate, 359 Pa. 147 (1948), Digest #14
It was held that a provision for taxes on property passing under the will did
not cover extra-testamentary property. The provision read: "I direct that all inheritance, estate, succession or similar duties or taxes which shall become payable in respect to any property or interest passing under my will or any codicil which
I may hereafter execute, shall be paid out of the principal of my estatle, without
diminution of any devises, bequests or legacies." The court approved allocation of
federal estate tax in the amount of $31,031.18 to extra-testamentary property, and
of federal estate tax in the amount of $48,950.23 against principal of the residuary
testamentary estate.
Knight Trust, 72 D. & C. 109 (C. P. #3 Of
Phila. County, 1949), Digest #15
The decedent had created an inter vivos deed of trust, includible in his
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. He died a resident of Rhode Island,
leaving a will which provided, paragraph 7, as follows: "I direct that all the foregoing gifts, devises, bequests and life interests shall, so far as possible, be paid free
and clear of all succession, inheritance or estate taxes, which taxes I direct shall be
paid out of the principal of my residuary estate." It was held that the inter vivos
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trust should bear its share of federal estate tax, as the tax clause in the will "does
not appear to have any application whatsoever to taxes which may be assessed on
property included in testator's gross estate for tax purposles, but not passing under
the will."
Rice Estate, 65 York 29 (1951), Digest #16
The testator provided for death taxes by the following paragraph of his will
which was executed about seven months before he died: "I hereby order and direct
that the legacies and devise contained in Items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, be paid and delivered without deduction for or on account of any Federal or State Inheritance,
estate or succession taxes, all of which I direct shall be paid out of the residue of
my estate, and I direct my executors to pay all such taxes on the whole estate which
shall pass at the time of my death." The decedent had made a lifetime transfer of
$50,000 to his wife about eight months before he died, and this lifetime transfer was
ultimately held to be includible in the gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.
This decision held that federal estate tax to the extent of $12,448.05 should be
prorated against and paid by the estate of the decedent's widow, who had died by
the time the case came to trial. The judge emphasized the fact that the lifetime
transfer was not a legacy or devise and did not "pass at the time of ...

death" and

therefore was not covered by the tax clause. Stadtfelt Estate, 359 Pa. 147, was cited
and quoted in part. Also cited were Ely Estate, 28 D. & C. 663; Reed Estate, 45
D. & C. 628; Lucey Estate, 63 D. & C. 645; and May Estate, 94 Pitts. 209. Crooks
Estate, 36 D. & C. 58 was considered to have "facts ...

quite different from the

case at bar." In summary, the tax clause was considered to be "entirely destitute and
devoid of any thought or possible inference that he intended to direct that his
estate should bear the burden of the Federal Tax on the lifetime transfer. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius seems to be maxim clearly applicable."
Miller Estate 59 D. & C. 472 (0. C. Of
Dela. County, 1946), Digest #17

The will provided, "I direct that all inheritance, succession and estate taxes
shall be paid out of th-e residue of my estate." There were later codicils, and in
one an outright legacy to A and B was changed to a trust with income to A and B.,
and a legacy was added for C. The trust for A and B was held to be free of tax, both
because the tax clause quoted above was not by its terms restricted to provisions in
the original will and because a substituted or additional legacy "is subject to the
same conditions as the original legacy, for example, freedom from tax." Furthermore, the court felt that the tax clause was strong enough to protect the new legacy
to C from any deduction for taxes. Rettew Estate, 142 Pa. Super. 335, was distinguished because that will contained language not as broad as in Miller's will.
Dewart'sPetition, 16 Northum. 59, was mentioned as contrary, but through dictum
not essential to the decision. The present decision mentioned that Henlein Est., 26
Erie 13, dealt with a provision in a codicil for taxes "on above bequests" which was
held not to free the gifts in the will itself from taxes.
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Thompson Estate, 64 D. & C. 77 (0. C. Of
Erie County, 1947), Digest #18
Item 1 of the will provided: "I direct my executors to pay.. out of my
estate ... any and all inheritance taxes or estate taxes that may be assessed against
any bequest made hereunder or against beneficiaries by virtue of such bequests."
There were two codicils, each confirming the will except as modified by the codicils.
It was held that estate and inheritance taxes upon legacies in the codicils as well as
in the original will should be paid from the residuary estate.
Spangenberg Estate, 359 Pa. 353 (1948), Digest #19
A provision for taxes in a codicil was held to extend to the will itself. The
will, dated June 30, 1938, left the "large" residue in trust for the testatrix's cousin.
Upon death of the cousin, the principal of the trust was to be distributed to a charity.
The codicil, dated August 9, 1945, contained several bequests and then the wording:
"I direct that all taxes imposed upon my Estate, as well as all inheritance and transfer taxes on any of the legacies hereinabove given, shall be paid from and charged
against my residuary estate." The court said: "If testatrix had desired to limit the
payment of the tax out of the corpus to those legacies given in the codicil, she
would have so directed." ". . . the appellant's life interest in the residuary estate
(was) relieved of the obligation of paying the transfer inheritance tax and
that burden was ... shifted to the corpus of the residuary estate."
Cunningham Estate, 69 D. & C. 579 (0. C.
Of Lawrence County, 1949), Digest #20
The will directed payment of all death taxes, but the testatrix had created
an inter vivos deed of trust the same day the will was executed, and had directed
in the deed of trust that death taxes assessed upon any of its "gifts or trusts" should
be paid from the residue of the inter vivos trust. The tax clause in the will provided: "I direct that any and all inheritance, estate, and transftr taxes which may be
imposed upon my estate or any part thereof, or any estate or any interest herein
given, by the State of Pennsylvania, or any other State, or by the United States,
shall be paid out of the corpus or principal of my residuary estate." The court's decision was that the deed of trust should pay its own death taxes, for the following
reasons:
1. The deed of trust and the will were executed the same day.
2. "Estate" was uniformly used throutghout the will and the deed to refer
to proprtyp assing under the will, while "trust" or "trust estate"
was used to designate property held by the inter vivos trust. Therefore "estate' 'in the tax clause of the will would exclude the trust estate.
3. The testatrix must have realized that federal estate tax is computed
on the taxable estate when she provided in the deed of trust for payment of its death taxes.
4. The tax clause in the deed of trust is couched in specific language,
while the terms of the tax clause in the will are general. The general
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rovision in the will must give way to the specific direction in the trust
5. By construing the will in the light of the contemporaneous deed of
trust, the exception in the Apportionment Act of 1937, "except where
a testator otherwise directs in his will," also would indicate the condusion that the presumption established by the act applies, and the
residue of the deed of trust must bear its own tax burden.
6. Two sons inherited outright under the will, but received only life
estates under the deed of trust. Without apportionment, the taxes
would entirely consume the residuary estate under the will. "It is inconceivable that she meant to make this gift illusory by saddling it with
the tax on a much larger trust fund.'
Anderson Estate, 312 Pa. 180 (1933), Digest #21
Sptcific exemption of a certain interest from payment of taxes may not prevent the exemption of other interests from taxes, when the reference is to "taxes of
any kind." The will read "I will that all my just debts, funeral expenses and taxes of
any kind, including Federal and State Inheritance, Transfer or Succession Taxes with
which my wife's interest under this will may (be) charged, shall be paid promptly
by my executor and charged out of my principal residuary estate as soon as it conveniently may be done after my decease." It was held that all the legacies were free
3f tax: "The language is reasonably dear."
Crooks Estate 36 D. & C. 58 (0. C. Of
Lycoming County, 1939), Digest #22
The tax provision read as follows: "I direct that all estate, inheritance and
transfer taxes of every kind and character assessed against my estate or against any
interest therein passing hereunder shall be paid from my residuary estate, and ...
all such taxes shall be considered as part of the expenses of the administration of
my estate." It was held that there should be no proration of federal estate tax to life
insurance proceeds retained at interest by the insurance companies for the primary
benefit of the decedent's wife and children. The opinion discussed various meanings of the word "estate" and decided that the testator used the word in its broadest
sense, to include the insurance proceeds, as otherwise the share of federal estate tax
applicable to the insurance would have equalled more than three years' interest on
the proceeds. The residuary testamentary estate was composed of "good and marketable stocks and bonds" worth over $200,000. Ely Estate was mentioned, but held
to contain "language ... entirely different." A "Note" in Dickinson Law Review,

Volume 54, page 449, claims that "the court did absolute violence to the decedent's
language in order to find a testatorial intention to exempt insurance (for the decedent's widow) from taxation."
Slattery Estate, 54 D. & C. 542 (0. C. Of
Montg. County, 1945), Digest #23
The court considered the applicability of the tax provision in the will, as it
might affect federal estate tax in respect to:
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) Life insurance payable to the widow,
Life insurance
payable to aofdeed
of trust.
(a Transfers
in contemplation
death,
The tax provision in the will read: "I direct that any and all inheritance,
estate and transfer taxes that may be imposed upon my estate or any part thereof,
or any estate or any interest herein given, by the State of Pennsylvania, or any other
State, or by the United States, shall be paid out of the corpus or principal of my
said residuary estate." The quoted provision was considered as directing "that any
conceivable tax by any taxing authority imposing a tax by virtue of his death shall
be paid out of the principal of his residuary estate." The reference to "my estate"
was held to mean "taxable estate," inasmuch as the federal government had taxed
(a), (b), (c) and (d) above as part of the estate. Attention was directed to the
disjunctive "or" as used in "or any estate or any interest herein given." Thus the
decision would appear to provide the following definitions:
(1) "My estate"-the entire taxable estate.
(2) the
"Orwill.
any estate or any interest herein given"-assets passing under
There was no reference in the decision to the comprehensive phrase "any and
all ... taxes." Nor was there direct reference to the fact that federal estate taxes
are primarily assessed ("imposed"?) against the testamentary estate, the argument
used in Prifer Est. Although not cited in the Slattery opinion, Crooks Est. had a
very similar tax provision, and the result was the same, i.e., no proration.
Williamson Estate, 61 Montg. 242 (1945), Digest #24
The following provision in the will was held to free life insurance proceeds
from apportionment of federal and Pennsylvania estate taxes: "I direct that all
estate, inheritance and/or succession taxes payable by the Executors of this my
Will, or may be assessed (sic) upon or chargeable upon any annuity, legacy, absolute, for life or a lesser period, shall be paid out of my residuary estate, and I
authorize my Executors, if they deem best, to pay all such taxes prior to or at the time
of the settlement of their account so that the ultimate remainders may be free of
such taxes upon vesting in possession." The decision stressed the fact that the estate
taxes were charged in the first instance against the excutors. Being "payable by the
Executors of this my Will," the taxes in question were directed by the will to be
paid from residue of the testamentary estate.
Brown Estate, 59 D. & C. 638 (0. C. Of
Lackawanna County, 1946), Digest #25
The testator had drawn his will in 1926, before enactment of the Apportionment Act of 1937, but did not die until 1944. However, "Testator was presumed to have known prior to his death" that the Apportionment Act of 1937 would be
applicable unless there was a contrary direction in his will. The tax clause read: "I
will and direct that all Estate Tax, inheritance tax, succession tax, transfer tax, or
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any other tax in the nature of any thereof, or upon any bequest, trust b'enefaction or
any interest in my estate or any part thereof given, or provided for by my will, shall
be paid out of my general estate, so that all provisions or benefactions of every kind
or nature given or made by this my will shall be free of all taxes aforesaid." The
testamentary property was valued at $24,768.83 less deductions of $5,159.13, leaving a balance of $19,609.70. Extra-testamentary property amounted to $74,976.67
and included:
Real estate, Tenancy by the entirety ....................................

U. S. Defense bonds joint with wife
Participating certificates in Independence Fund of North

$ 7,000.00

1,540.25

America, of which the wife was sole beneficiary ........

2,623.27

Checking account joint with wife ........................................
Life insurance payable to wife ..............................................
Life insurance under options for wife and then children ......

651.28
3,992.71
59,169.16

$74,976.67
The questions presented were whether federal estate tax should be prorated
against the beneficiaries of the non-testamentary property, and whether the wife
should pay the inheritance tax on the participating certificates. The judge held in
the negative, and directed that both federal estate and Pennsylvania inheritance
tax be paid entirely from the residuary testamentary estate. The court reasoned that
•tbe testator knew his testamentary estate by itself would not be large enough for
federal estate tax, and therefore by including in his will a provision for payment
of "Estate Tax" he meant to cover federal estate tax on extra-testamentary property.
As to the inheritance tax on the participating certificates, the opinion states, "Testator, in his will, directed that all inheritance taxes be paid out of his general fund."
The testator's wife was the primary beneficiary of the testamentary dispositions
and of the life insurance, and was the surviving owner of the jointly held assets.
The court believed that proration of the federal estate tax against the widow's
assets "would be in derogation of testator's purposes and intentions."
Moreland Estate was distinguished because there the language referred only
to "each and every bequest made by me in this my Last Will." Prifer Estate was
cited as similar to the case at bar, both as to issues and decision, but without noting
that the beneficiaries of extra-testamentary property in Prifer Estate had to pay their
own inheritance taxes. Glatfelter Estate, where there was proration, was mentioned
only as following Moreland Estate.
In summary, the distinguishing features in Brown Estate might be said to be:
(1) Testamentary estate only $20.000.

(2) The widow could ill afford to pay a prorated tax.
The opinion did not comment on the various disjunctives or the "so that"
in the tax clause. However, could not the same result have been reached by stressing
"interest . . . given, or (interest) provided for by my will . . . so that all . . .
benefactions ... given or (benefactions) made by this my will . . .," considering
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"given" as applying to the non-testamentary property for which takers-at-death were
settled upon during life, as distinguished from provisions in the will?
Stoeckel Estate, 72 D. & C. 439 (0. C. Of
Montg. County, 1950), Digest #26
The tax clause read: "I direct my Executor to pay all Inheritance and Federal
Estate taxes out of the principal of my estate, so that all legatees shall receive their
legacies in full and without responsibility therefor." The decedent and Elizabeth
A. Meyer had a joint survivorship saving fund account in the amount of $3,710.62,
subject to inheritance tax on one half the value. Federal estate tax apportioned to
the joint account amounted to $675.33. Elizabeth A. Meyer was also the beneficiary of a $1,000 legacy under the will. Judge Holland decided that the tax
clause relieved the legatee from the payment of both taxes and that she should receive her $1,000 in full, inasmuch as the will directed that all taxes be paid from
residue, that legatees should receive their legacies in full and "without responsibility therefor." The decision cited Prifer Est., 53 D. & C. 103; Brown Est., 59
D. & C. 638; and Slattery Est., 54 D. & C. 542, but did not comment on the fact
that the beneficiaries of extra-testamentary property in Prifer Est. were relieved of
federal estate tax but not of inheritance tax. In the Stoeckel decision, no reference
was made to the possibility of collecting the inheritance and estate tax on the joint
saving account directly from the beneficiary. The relationship of the beneficiary to
the testator is not mentioned in the adjudication. A question may arise in the reader's mind as to whether the surviving owner of the joint saving account could have
been relieved of the death taxes if she had not also been a legatee, in view of the
qualification in the tax clause, "so that all legatees shall receive their legacies in
full." (Emphasis supplied.)
York Estate, 75 D. & C. 164 (0. C. Of
Lehigh County, 1950), Digest #27
The wil provided "First: I authorize and direct my hereinafter named Executors to pay all my just debts, funeral expenses and any and all inheritance, transfer or estate taxes, whether the same be levied by the Federal Government or any of
the states of the United States, from and out of my estate, as soon as may be convenient after my decease." The decedent's two daughters were beneficiaries of insurance on the life of the decedent, included at $58,000 in his gross estate for federal
estate tax purposes. The Tax Apportionment Act of 1937 was held inapplicablc
and it was ruled that all federal estate tax was to be paid from the testamentary
estate. "The tax in question is an 'estate tax and is levied by the Federal Government.
The testator in plain words directs that this shall be paid out of his estate." There
was no limitation of the tax clause to "each and every bequest" in a will, nor to
"any property or interest passing under my will," phrases found in other situations
where apportionment was applied.
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Ely Estate, 28 D. & C. 663 (0. C. Of
Phila. County, 1935), Digest #28
This case was decided before the enactment of the Estate Tax Apportionment
Act of 1937; but after the enactment of a federal estate tax apportionment provision as to life insurance. Mr. Ely had during his lifetime created a revocable funded
life insurance trust, but made no reference to death taxes therein. In his will he
provided for death taxes as follows: "I further direct that there shall be paid from
the corpus of my estate all Income, Estate, Succession, Transfer and Inheritance
Taxes levied against either my estate or the devisees and legatees and beneficiaries of
my said estate and under this will." The decision apportioned a share of federal and
state estate taxes to the beneficiaries of the life insurance policies, but held that federal and state estate taxes applicable to the non-insurance assets of the deed of trust
should be paid by the general testamentary estate. "It is, in effect, an expense of
administration." A state inheritance tax, on the other hand, imposed on the assets
of the inter vivos trust, was held to be payable by the deed of trust. The opinion
construed the testamentary provision for taxes as referring only to the testamentary
estate and not to the trust estate as well. Estate taxes applicable to the non-insurance
assets of the inter vivos trust were charged to the testamentary estate because of
their classification as administration expenses, and not because of the direction for
payment of taxes contained in the will.
Reed Estate, 45 D. & C. 628 (0. C. Of
Montg. County, 1942), Digest #29
The decedent had created two inter vivos trusts that were determined to
be subject to Pennsylvania inheritance tax. In his will he stated: "I order and direct
that all inheritance, legacy, succession, or similar duties or taxes shall be paid out of
my residuary estate." It was held that the inheritance taxes on the inter vivos trusts
should be borne by the trusts and not by the testamentary estate. The direction for
payment of taxes quoted above was referred to as "nothing more than the ordinary
stereotyped and familiar clause found in so many wills" and insufficient by itself
to grant "a legacy" in the form of tax payments, to the beneficiaries of the inter
vivos trusts. Crooks Estate and Ely Estate were distinguished because they dealt
with estate taxes as contrasted with inheritance taxes.
Glatfelter Estate, 60 York 77 (1946), Digest #30
The tax clause in the will read: "All inheritance, estate, succession, or transfer tax or taxes, whether state or federal, or any other tax in the nature thereof,
which may be chargeable upon my estate or upon any portion thereof, or upon any
devise, bequest, legacy or trust given or provided for by my will, or upon any
chattels herein disposed of, shall be paid out of the principal of my residuary estate
so that such devise, bequest, legacy or trust provided for by this my will, and any
chattels herein disposed of, shall be free and clear of all taxes." The testator had
created a taxable inter vivos deed of trust, and the question was presented to the
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court as to whether under the above-quoted tax clause in the will, the federal estate
tax and Pennsylvania inheritance tax were wholly payable from the residue of the
testamentary estate. Citing Moreland Estate, 351 Pa. 623 (1945), the court reached
the conclusion "that the testator's direction with respect to the payment of taxes
is limited to the payment of taxes in his testamentary estate." The thinking seemed
to be that the Glatfelter tax clause referred only to legacies, etc., in the will itself.
There was no discussion of the word "estate" as in Crooks Estate, 36 D. & C. 58
(1939) and Slattery Estate, 54 D. & C. 542 (1945), nor to the disjunctive "or"
as in Slattery Estate. Although no comment was made in the Glatfelter opinion
in regard to the "so that" clause forming the last part of the provision for taxes, it
is interesting to note Judge Hunter's emphasis in the later Kyle Estate, 1 Fid. Rep.
131 (0. C. Phila. Co., 1947), of the similar "it being my intention that all
legacies herein given shall be without deduction for any such tax or taxes."
Evans Estate, 57 D. & C. 55 (0.C. Of
Dauphin County, 1945), Digest #31
The question arose as to the applicability of the provision for taxes, as to
United States Savings Bonds registered in the name of the decedent ". . . or Miss
Georgina Evans Bevan," which bonds had been purchased and retained by the decedent, in his safe deposit box to which the surviving co-owner did not have access.
However, the decedent had informed Miss Bevan that he had designated her as coowner of the bonds. In his will the decedent had stated: "I direct that all inheritance and estate taxes, State and Federal, assessable against my estate, or against the
various persons sharing therein, shall be paid out of the residue of my estate." The
decision held that the bonds "passed by contract to Miss Bevan upon the death
of Mr. Evans and that at the moment of his death they were part of his estate.
It follows that the provisions of his will relating to the payment of estate and
inheritance taxes are applicable and that the (inheritance) tax must be paid from
the residue of the estate." The decision also held that the bonds became the property of Miss Bevan upon the death of Mr. Evans, and that the collateral tax of 101o
applied to the full appraised value of the bonds and not to one half of their value.
Thus, there was consistency in taxing the bonds at full value as part of the "estate"
and in charging the tax against the estate.
Wood Estate, 48 Lanc. 389 (1943), Digest #32
"I give and bequeath unto my dear friend, Lena H. Coates, the sum of Six
thousand five hundred dollars ...should Lena H. Coates, (sic) death occur before
mine it is my will that this Six thousand five hundred dollars, shall revert to the
residue of my estate, but I give and bequeath unto her son Howard Coates, the sum
of One thousand dollars, free and clear of collateral inheritance tax." Lena survived and received $6,500 free of inheritance tax, the judge noting that the testator
had good reasons for favoring Lena as an heir in distribution of his $10,000 estate,
and that legacies in preceding paragraphs of the will had been made "free and
clear of inheritance tax."
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Miles Estate, 31 Northampton 67 (1947), Digest #33
The will executed December 31, 1930 provided a legacy of $2,000 to "my
friend, Anna Hughes" and later directed "that all Inheritance or Succession taxes,
whether State or Federal, on all of the above legacies and devise shall be paid out
of my general estate." A codicil dated July 31, 1945 provided for payment "to Anna
Hughes $30 weekly as wages for the time she has been with me." It was agreed
that Anna Hughes had resided with the testatrix for 778 weeks. The question arose
whether the product, $23,340, (30 x 778) was a legacy and whether it was free
of inheritance tax, or whether it was a testamentary direction to pay a debt. The
$23,340 was held to be an additional pecuniary legacy, subject to the same incidents
and conditions as the $2,000 given in the will (Croxton Est., 289 Pa. 433). The
original legacy being free of inheritance tax, it was ruled that the additional legacy
was also free of inheritance tax. The $2,000 legacy and the $23,340 were both gifts
absolute in nature, and id'entical in quality and interests.
Croxton Estate, 289 Pa. 433 (1927), Digest #34
This decision dealt with an additional legacy with no expressed freedom
from tax, although the first legacy to the same charity was "free and clear of all inheritance tax." Three separate sections of the will were dealt with in the opinion.
One gave $100,000 to the Toledo Hospital "free and clear of all inheritance tax."
The next provided that $10,000 should be divided among three relatives. Thun
followed another provision giving $50,000 to the Toledo Hospital "as an additional bequest." The will had provided that the first legacy should be paid in full, then
the second, and so on, in the case of insufficient funds. The $50,000 additional
bequest to the hospital was held to be subject to the same conditions as the first
bequest to the hospital. Since the first was specifically free of inheritance tax,
the additional bequest was also free of inheritance tax.
Rettew Estate, 142 Pa. Super. 335 (1940), Digest #35
The executors were directed to convert the residuary estate "into money
(and) to pay the proceeds thereof, after deducting all taxes, costs, the direct inheritance taxes, charges and expenses of every kind as follows:". By two codicils,
certain personal property and real estate were bequeathed and devised to individuals.
The residue was given to two charities. The court held that the individual legatees
and devisees must pay their respective inheritance taxes. "Testatrix's will plainly
shows that the direction to pay 'direct inheritance tax' from the proceeds of the
conversion of the residuary estate, relates 'exclusively to the residuary estate." The
decision did not pay any particular attention to the prase, "after deducting all
taxes."
Wyndham Estate, 1 Fid. Rep. 136 (0. C. Of
Phila. County, 1949), Digest #36
The tax clause read: "I direct that any and all inheritance, estate and transfer taxes that may be imposed upon my estate or any part thereof or any estate or
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any interest herein given, by the State of Pennsylvania or any other State or by the
United States, or by any other Government, shall be chargeable proportionately
against and shall be payable out of the interest of each legatee and devisee repectively." (Emphasis supplied.) The testatrix left the residue of her estate in trust for an
individual for life. The question presented was whether the life tenant must directly
bear and pay a share of the federal estate tax based on the value of his equitable life
estate. The judge ruled that the life tenant was not strictly a legatee or devisee and
need not contribute to the federal estate tax. The judge noted that if there had been
no tax clause, the Apportionment Act of 1937 would have freed the life tenant
from directly paying a share of the federal estate tax. The federal 'estate tax applicable to the residuary trust was ordered to be paid from the residuary principal.
Pennsylvania inheritance tax was not directly in issue, but the proposed schedule
of distribution was approved and in it the life tenant was charged with the inheritance tax on his life estate, as an "equitable adjustment."
F. The tax clause in most situations should give authority to the executor
and trustee to prepay the Pennsylvania inheritance tax on remainder interests, to
avoid the difficulties encountered in:
Tallman Estate (Digest 37),
Constable Estate (Digest 38),
Henry Estate (Digest 39)
Tallman Estate, 10 D. & C. 89 (0. C. Of
Phila. County, 1928), Digest #37
A question arose as to the following direction for taxes: "I direct that all inheritance taxes upon my 'estate, both as to life estate and the estate in remainder,
shall be paid by my executor in due course." The quoted provision was held to be a
mere statement that the executor should pay the tax, with no direction as to how
it should be charged, and therefore each legatee was required to pay his own tax.
In spite of the direction that the "executor" should pay the tax on "the estate in
remainder," it was held that the trustee should pay the remainder tax when the
cquitable life estates terminate. The same trust company was executor and trustee.
Constable Estate, 299 Pa. 509 (1930) And 303
Pa. 567 (1931), Digest #38
Here is demonstrated the danger in prepaying taxes due in the future when
permission to do so is not given by the decedent. Part of this opinion dealt with
5% collateral inheritance tax on a legacy of stock appraised at $8,000, given to A
for life with remainder to others. The executor paid the tax on the entire $8,000
rather than on A's life estate, and was surcharged for the advance payment of tax
on the remainder interest. The value of the stock had decreased greatly in value by
the time the case was heard and it appeared evident that the erroneous prepayment
of the remainder tax was prejudicial to the remaindermen of the stock legacy. In
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addition, A was found liable for interest on his share of tax which was paid by
the estate and not collected from him.
Henry Estate, 18 D. & C. 667 (0. C. Of
Lehigh County, 1933), Digest #39
This case also demonstrates the danger of prepaying a remainder tax unless
permission is granted in a will or deed of trust. In Henry Estate, the executors had
paid the entire tax because the surviving spouse (life tenant) had originally intended to take against the will. The executors were surcharged for the portion of tax
applicable to the remainder interest. Apparently there was no great hardship
through the surcharge, as the three executors were remaindermen entitled to the
corpus at the expiration of the life interest.
G. Difficulties have arisen through failure of the tax clause to be specific
as to the exact source of payment in various situations. There follows an attempt to
label the problems and group the decisions pertaining thereto.
Insufficiency of residue. Greaves Estate, McCutcheon Estate, Bryant
Estate,Curtze Estate, Henlein Estate and White Estate. (Digests
40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45).
Residue divided into shares for both direct and collateral heirs, or for
charities exempt from federal estate tax. Brown Estate, Uber
Estate, North Estate, PitzerEstate and Wahr Estate. (Digest 46,
47, 48, 49 and 50).
Direction to pay taxes without specifying residuary principal as the source.
Tallman Estate, Horn Estate, Dewart Petition (Swenk Estate),
Smith Estate and Brown Estate. (Digests 37, 51, 52, 53 and
54).
Source of additional inheritance tax due on death of a life tenant. Marvin
Estate and Schoen Estate. (Digests 55 and 56).
Tax clause in inter vivos deed of trust effective even though the income
was directly diminished. McLaughlin Estate (Digest 57).
Greaves Estate, 29 Dist. R. 577 (0. C. Of
Phila. County, 1920), Digest #40
The decision has a headnote which adequately describes the question and the
decision as follows:
"Where general legacies are given clear of the direct and collateral inheritance taxes due the Commonwealth and the Federal estate tax, and there is no residuary fund from which the taxes may be paid, each legacy must bear its own share
of such taxation; where specific legacies and devises are so given and there is no
residuary estate out of which the taxes may be paid, the amount of the tax is regarded as a general legacy and as such abates with other general legacies on insufficiency of assets."
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McCutcheon Estate, 19 D. & C. 131 (.0. C. Of
Phila. County, 1933), Digest #41
The tax clause read: "I direct that all bequests made by me, in the third paragraph of this my will be paid to the individual legatees named in full. All taxes
incident to said bequests, whether State or Federal, and of whatsoever nature, I
direct to be paid out of my residuary estate before the principal sum forming the
tesiduary is distributed . . ." The composition of the principal of the estate for distribution was as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Specific bequests of personal effects, tax to be paid from
$ 8,371.80
residuary estate ...............................................
Pecuniary legacies to individuals per third paragraph of
w ill .......................................................
3 6,0 0 0 .0 0
Pecuniary legacies to charities per fourth, fifth, sixth
and seventh paragraphs of will ...................................
19,000.00

$63,371.80
Deficit ....................................................
34 5.3 8
Balance of principal for distribution ............................
$63,026.42
Was B. to be preferred over C? The court said "no." "The Fiduciaries Act,
section 20 . . . provides for the pro rata abatement of pecuniary legacies where the
residue after the payment of debts and expenses is not sufficient ... Waln's Estate,
109 Pa. 479, is applicable." The court held that "in full" in the first sentence of the
tax clause was no stronger expression of intent than was indicated in the second
sentence. A vigorous dissent was ruled by Judge Stearne who felt that "in full"
was unambiguous.
Bryant Estate, 315 Pa. 151 (1934), Digest #42
This decision dealt with an estate insufficient to have a residue, though the
will provided: "I direct that all collateral inheritance, Federal estate and other
taxes payable at my death shall be paid out of my residuary estate if the said residuary
'estate shall be sufficient for that purpose, to the end that, if practicable, the pecuniary and specific legatees mentioned in this Will may get their legacies in full, or
shall suffer no deduction therefrom beyond what may be necessary to pay said taxes."
The testator made certain bequests, and then bequeathed $230,000 to specified charities, $275,000 in trust for a nephew and his descendants, and $300,000 in trust
for a niece and her descendants. The will provided that the gifts in trust for the
nephew and niece were to have precedence in case of insuficiency of assets. Residue
was given outright to the nephew, but, as has been mentioned above, there was no
residue. The trustees for the niece and nephew tried to secure an additional award
equal to their inheritance tax, to be paid from the already depleted fund for the
charities as an additional legacy under the principal announced in Croxton Estate,
289 Pa. 433. However, the decision went against them, the judge holding that the
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tax clause quoted above, by its express terms, applied only if there were a residuary
estate. Since there was no residue, the trusts for the niece and nephew were not free
of inheritance tax.
Curtze Estate, 25 Erie 48 (1943), Digest #43

This case dealt with a direction in a will to pay all death taxes from the
residuary estate. However, there was no residuary estate and the court held that
"each legacy or devise must pay its part of said taxes."
Henlein Estate, 26 Erie 13 (1943), Digest #44
There was no provision for taxes in the will itself, but a codicil made more
than a year after the will provided "All taxes on above bequests to be paid from
estate." It was held that the tax clause was limited to the bequests in the codicil
alone. The judge noted that there were not sufficient assets in the residuary estate
to pay the inheritance taxes upon the bequests in the will as well as the codicil,
but it does not appear that the decision was predicated on the size of the residue.
White Estate, 63 D. & C. 408 (0. C. Of
Phila. Coulnty, 1948), Digest #45

The tax clause read: "I direct that all the foregoing gifts, devises, bequests
and life interests, shall be paid free and clear of all succession, inheritance and
estate taxes, which taxes I direct shall be paid out of the residue or balance of the
combined fund or estate, which residue or balance is disposed of in the next succeeding paragraph of this Will." The "combined fund or estate" was the result of
the testatrix exercising a testamentary power of appointment, directing that the
appointed estate be added to her own. The residuary estate was insufficient to pay
all taxes, and the question arose as to whether the specific legacies should share in
the tax burden. The mathematics were approximately as follows:
Specific legacies ..............................................
$ 156,000.00
General legacies
................................
31,400.00
R esid ue ...................................................
$ 3,6 0 0.0 0
Less-Estate and Inheritance taxes ..................
33,000.00

D eficit in residue ............................................
-(29,400.00)

N et estate after taxes .........................................
$158,000.00
In the original adjudication, it was held that the taxes were additional legacies,
to be added to the list of general legacies, and to abate with them proportionately.
Exceptions were filed and in the present decision it was held that the deficit ($29,400) occasioned by taxes should be apportioned as an abatement equally among both
the general and specific legacies. Judge Hunter referred to "cases beyond number"
where "specific bequests have been preferred over general legacies under the common-law rule of abatement. It is assumed that the primary object of a testator's
bounty is the specific legatee, and that testator would want the legacy delivered
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to the specific legatee without charge or lien in favor of the general legatee." However, he felt that decisions such as in Greaves Estate, 29 Dist. R. 577, and McCutcheon Estate, 19 D. & C. 131, should be overruled "in these days of heavy taxation"
where the testator expressly places the burden of the tax on the residuary legatees.
"In the instant case the specific legacies of stock are overwhelming in value and the
taxes large, and the application of the rule in Greaves Estate brings a result that
is inequitable."
Brown Estate, 208 Pa. 161, (1904), Digest #46
There was no provision for taxes as such, but the will provided for a trust
of residue, and the division of net income "in equal shares" among certain named
persons "after taking any and all necessary expenses." The court held that the collateral taxes on life estates should be paid from income and not from principal and
that the life tenants should bear the burden of the taxes in equal proportions and
not in accordance with their respective life estate values.
Uber Estate, 330 Pa. 417 (1938), Digest #47
The tax clause read: "Any and all taxes that may be due and payable upon
the devise of the real 'estate, legacies and bequests shall be paid out of and from
the principal of my residuary estate." The tax clause followed a devise of one
item of real estate, a bequest of jewelry and three cash legacies, and preceded the
devise and bequest of the residuary estate, half of which was given outright to the
testator's brother and half of which was left in trust for the testator's daughter.
It was held that the tax clause applied only to the gifts that preceded it in the
will, and that the brother's share of residue was subject to its 10% tax, while
the daughter's share in trust was subject to only a 2% tax. Judicial notice was taken
of the use of the singular form "devise" in the tax clause, and that there were
several pieces of real estate included in the residuary estate. The appellant representing the brother's assignee sought to have the Pennsylvania inheritance tax
on the residue deducted before the residue was divided. The court refused to adopt
that construction, saying: "In the case of every will where there are gifts or equal
half parts of an estate, and one of the legatees is a lineal descendant and the other
a collateral relative of the testator, the liabilities for their respective inheritance
taxes will make their net legacies unequal notwithstanding the prescribed equality;
such a result can be avoided only by an unequivocal testamentary direction that the
net shares, after the payment of the inheritance taxes, are to be equal and the taxes
paid out of the residuary estate as a whole. In the present case we find no such clear
direction."
One reading this decision may come to the conclusion that the wording and
position of the tax clause was sufficient evidence of the testator's intention that
it applied only to the devise and bequests preceding it. In that event, the last part
of the opinion might be considered as dictum. However, it appears that the court
considered the latter part of the opinion as buttressing the first part, and at least it is
a statement of policy by our highest court.
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North Estate, 50 D. & C. 703 (0. C. Of
Phila. County, 1944), Digest #48
The tax clause followed the dispositive provisions and read: "I direct that
any and all inheritance, estate and transfer taxes that may be imposed upon my
estate, or any part thereof, by the State of Pennsylvania, or any other State, or by
the United States, shall be paid out of the corpus or principal of my residuary estate
." (Here followed an exception as to taxes on an appointed estate, not material
to the issue.) A portion of the estate was bequeathed to charities, whose shares were
deductible in computing the net estate subject to federal estate tax. It was held
that the Tax Apportionment Act of 1937 had no application "as the testatrix has in
her will plainly designated the manner in which the Federal estate taxes are to be
paid. In our opinion, the direction to pay the estate taxes 'out of the corpus or
principal of my residuary estate' indicates that the testatrix intended that all taxes
be paid in full before distribution is made of the residue." The provision for distribution of the second half of the residuary estate into "seventeen equal parts or
shares" among individuals and charities, and repetition of "One equal part or share
thereof I give, devise and bequeath to . . ." strengthened the court's conclusion.
Brown Estate, 208 Pa. 161 (1904), was cited as a precedent.
- Pitzer Estate, 62

York 190 (1949), Digest #49

The tax clause read, "All inheritance taxes and estate taxes which may be
levied against my estate shall be paid from the proceeds of sale of my home property,
No. 550 Broadway, Hanover, Pa., to the end that all legacies and bequests herein
made, shall be delivered and fully paid without deduction on account of any of said
taxes." This tax clause followed all other dispositive provisions in the will. A bequest of the proceeds of sale of premises 550 Broadway was revoked in a codicil and
the real estate fell into the residuary estate. The residuary estate was left, half to a
nephew (10% Pennsylvania Collateral Inheritance Tax) and half to an adopted
son (2% tax). The entire transfer inheritance tax was deducted from the residuary
balance of the estate before making distribution in equal shares to the adopted
son and the nephew. The adopted son filed exceptions, claiming that only 2%
of his residuary share should be deducted from his share, and that 10% tax on the
residuary share of the nephew should be deducted from the nephew's share. The
exceptions were dismissed. The facts in Uber Estate, 330 Pa. 417 (1938), were
distinguished because there the tax clause preceded the devise and bequest of the
residuary estate, while here it followed the residuary provisions. At the same time
reliance was placed on the comment in Uber Estate," . . . The testator may direct
that the tax on the entire residuary estate should be paid from it as a whole, instead
of each of the participating beneficiaries paying the tax applicable to his own share."
In the Pitzer will, the judge expressed the opinion that the testatrix had clearly directed that the tax should be paid from the residuary estate as a whole. The argument that the adopted son was a favored beneficiary was dismissed, as the will did
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not favor the adopted son over the nephew. In fact, the codicil substituted the.
nephew as executor in place of the adopted son.
Wabr Estate, 370 Pa. 382 (1952), Digest #50
There was no tax clause but the residue was divided into "twelve equal
shares or parts." Six of the shares went to charities. The court ruled that the charitable gifts, not contributing to the tax burden, should be relieved from the payment
of any part of the federal estate tax. This decision overruled the Orphans' Court
of Allegheny County, which had relied on North Estate, 50 D. & C. 703 (1944).
Horn Estate, 351 Pa. 131 (1945), Digest #51

The testatrix provided for the payment of taxes but did not specifically provide that they were payable from residue. Nevertheless, the court held that the
taxes should be paid from the residuary estate. The provision relating to taxes was:
"I direct the payment of my just debts, the expense of probating my estate, and
all inheritanceand State Taxes, as well as real estate, personal property taxes thereon, and all administration expenses, and all taxes of any character, to be paid
out of my estate before the payment of the legacies and bequests and devises (sic.)
hereinafter made." (Emphasis supplied.) Appellant contended that "before"
meant "prior in time," but the court held that the quoted provision would have
been unnecessary in the will unless taxes were payable from residue. "A construction
of a will which renders every word operative is to be preferred to one which makes
some words and sentences idle and nugatory."
Petition Of Dewart (Swenk Estate,) 16*
Northumberland 59 (1946), Digest #52
The tax clause read: "I order and direct that inheritance and other taxes
incident to the settlement of my estate by paid by my estate." It was held that the
legatee of a specific bequest of corporate stock and one table must pay the 10%
Pennsylvania inheritance tax of $526.46, citing Tallman Est., 10 D. & C. 89. The
judge in the Dewart Petition referred to the provision for taxes as an "attempted
tax-free clause," without sufficient clarity to free the bequests from tax. The testatrix had failed to direct payment of the taxes from residue.
Smith Estate, 57 Dauph. 351 (1946), Digest #53
Item 1 of the will read: "I direct my just debts, if any, and my funeral expenses as well as the inheritance taxes on my estate to be paid out of my estate as
soon as can be done conveniently after my decease." It was held that inheritance
taxes were to be paid by the estate "before arriving at the amount available for distribution" with the result that the specific bequests were free of tax. The judge
expressed the belief that the decedent intended this result (1) by referring to inh'eritance taxes in her will; (2) by referring to "inheritance taxes on my estate;"
(3) by providing for payment of the taxes "out of my estate;" and (4) by placing
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the general provision "at the very beginning of the will." The decision made it
clear that to hold otherwise would have the effect of deleting the provision from
the will.
Brown Estate, 72 D. & C. 399 (0. C. Of
DelawareCounty, 1948), Digest # 54
The testatrix by her will left her residuary estate in trust for her nephew
for life. The tenth item of the will directed that "all collateral or other succession
tax or taxes that may be chargeable against any of the bequests herein made shall be
paid out of my residuary estate to the end that no bequest, whether pecuniary or
specific, shall suffer any diminution whatever by reason of any such tax or taxes."
In a codicil, the testatrix provided with respect to an annuity to be paid from income of the residuary trust, that "any collateral inheritance or other succession tax
or taxes that may be chargeable against the above bequest or against any of the bequests in my said Will or Codicils shall be paid out of my residuary estate." Since
the provisions for taxes had not specified a charge against principal of the residuary
estate, a question arose as to whether the tax on the nephew's life estate should be
charged to income or principal. It was held that the tax should be paid from
principal, the court believing that that was the intention of the testatrix. "Where
the intention that the gift of income is to be tax free is plainly inferable from the
will it is to be carried into effect."
Marvin Estate, 26 D. & C. 527 (0. C. Of
Montg. County, 1936), Digest #55
The tax clause followed provisions for the entire disposition of the estate and
read: "All payments hereinbefore directed, shall be made to or for the benefit of
the persons herein named, free of any tax or taxes therein now imposed, or which
may be imposed hereafter under the laws of the said State of Pennsylvania, or
of the United States, and any or all such taxes shall be paid out of my residuary
estate." The life tenant of a one-ninth share of residue in trust died. The life tenant
had been a direct heir of the testator. The 2% had been paid in full on the entire
residue, both life estates and remainder interests, but this life tenant had appointed
in favor of a collateral, so that a further 8% tax was due. The question arose as
to whether the additional 8% was chargeable against the one-ninth share of residue,
or against the entire residue. In the original adjudication, only one-ninth of the
additional tax was charged against the fund presently being accounted for. On exceptions, Judge Holland determined that the additional 8% was wholly chargeable against the one-ninth share of residue passing to a collateral heir. He held that
the present tax clause "is not susceptible to the construction that testator intended
to make the entire tax on principal of the residue, to be imposed at rates unpredictable until the relationship of the several appointees should be fixed, a charge
on the whole principal ...Aside from the question of construction of the will,
there is the further objection of withholding part of each share of principal, as it
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becomes distributable absolutely, pending determination of the future liability of
that share for its proportionate part of the tax due on other shares." It may be
noted that trusts of two-ninths of the residue had previously terminated and had
been distributed.
Schoen Estate, 1 Fid. Rep. 113 (0. C. Of
Phila. County, 1951), Digest #56
The tax provision read: "I direct that all inheritance and succession taxes,
whether State or Federal, that shall be charged against my estate or any portion of it,
shall be paid out of my residuary estate." Half the residuary estate was left in trust
for a daughter, Elsie McLanahan, who was given a general power of appointment
by will. The other half of the residuary estate was left in trust for another daughter,
Emeline B. S. Held. Mrs. Held was given a general power of appointment by will
over her half, except as to $16,000 which remained in trust for a grandson; and
Mrs. Held exercised her power by appointing in trust with income to her husband,
a collateral of the original testatrix, Lavinia J. Schoen. Mrs. Held, who exercised
the power, died insolvent, so the taxes had to come from the Schoen estate. The
question raised was whether the taxes should be charged against both shares of
residue, or only the share from which Mrs. Held had formerly received the income. It was held that the direct Pennsylvania inheritance tax on the $16,000 fund
for the grandson (part of the residue) should be charged against principal of the
$16,000 fund; that the additional 8% as collateral Pennsylvania inheritance tax
on the life estate of Mr. Held (son-in-law of the original testatrix) should be charged against Mr. Held's income; that the appreciable federal estate tax (approximately $27,000) applicable to Mrs. Held's exercise of the general power of appointment should be charged against the share over which Mrs. Held had exercised
the power, and not against the entire residuary estate of Mrs. Schoen which included the half remaining in trust for Mrs. Held's sister.
McLaughlin Estate, 39 D. & C. 573 (0. C. Of
Phila. County, 1940), Digest #57
The ded of trust had the following tax clause, "Any inheritance or succession
faxes due upon the passing of the trust estate or the fund created and contemplated
by this indenture, shall be computed upon and paid from the corpus, so that the
life estates hereunder shall be so enjoyed free from deduction for any such taxes."
Th'e life tenant claimed that the deed of trust should not bear any of the tax, since
payment from the trust would diminish the income. The exceptions of the life
tenant were dismissed, the court saying, "There is involved no invasion of income
in the sense intended by the settlor."
H. There have been a few more cases of interest in this discussion, which
may be classed as "miscellaneous," several of them dealing with attempts to imply
a tax clause from wording used in the will.
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Authorization to residuary heir to sell stocks to pay taxes did free specific
bequests from taxes. Youngblood Estate. (Digest 58).
Legacies "outright" did not mean 'free of tax.' Edwards Estate. (Digest
59).
Direction to pay "all my just debts" did not free legacies from tax. Haupt
Estate. (Digest 60).
Taxes to be paid "for my residuary estate" ruled a typographical error
when from my residuary estate" was intended. Gredler Estate.
(Digest 61).
Option in will for sons to buy certain stock at half the market price from
a trust for charities to be set up "after deduction of proper
charges and expenses applicable thereto." Federal and state
estate taxes not apportioned to option. Mack Estate. (Digest
62).
Youngblood Estate, 117 Pa. Super. 550 (1935), Digest #58
The only reference to taxes read: "All other property of whatsoever nature
is left to my husband, in trust, and I empower and authorize him to sell such stocks
as he thinks proper or necessary for the payment of taxes and costs." There had
been specific bequests of a certain stock to a brother and sisters of the decedent.
The judge held that the will imposed the payment of the inheritance tax for that
stock not on the residuary estate, but on the recipients of the stock.
Edwards Estate, 56 D. & C. 682 (0. C. Of
Del. County, 1946), Digest #59
There was no true tax clause in the short will. Legacies were given to two
collaterals "outright at my death" and the argument was made that "outright"
meant 'wholly" or "completely," that is, without deduction of inheritance tax.
The decision, however, was that "outright" did not mean free of inheritance tax.
Haupt Estate, 57 D. & C. 416 (0. C. Of Nortampton
County, 1946), Digest #60
There was no tax clause as such, but the testatrix directed "all my just
debts and funeral expenses be fully paid" and bequeathed her residuary estate "after
payment of all the debts and liabilities of my estate." Legacies preceding the distribution of residue were held to be subject to inheritance tax, since Pennsylvania
inheritance tax is not a debt of the decedent nor a cost of administration, but a
tax on the right of succession and assessed against the legatees.
Gredler Estate, 31 Erie 464 (1948), Digest #61
The tax provision in the will read: "I hereby direct that my executor make
payment of any and all estate or inheritance taxes for my residuary estate." The
draftsman of the will testified that "for" was a typographical error and that the
testatrix had used "from." The court directed that the estate and inheritance taxes
should be paid from the residuary estate so that all bequests, other than of the residue, should be free of tax.
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Mack Estate, 74 D. &. C. 385 (0. C. Of
Allegheny County, 1949), Digest #62
The decision dealt with a will that had no comprehensive tax clause but provided for a trust of certain stock, valued at about $1,250,000, for charities "after
deduction of proper charges and expenses applicable thereto." However, two sons
of the t'estator had, and exercised, the right to buy the stock at half its market value.
The charities contended that the option given the sons to purchase the stock was a
bequest of property, and a share of the federal and Pennsylvania estate tax should
be charged against the sons since the value of the charities' interest was exempt
from estate tax, citing Harvey Estate, 350 Pa. 53. The auditing judge concluded
that the language, ".

.

. proper charges and expenses applicable thereto," was in-

tended by the testator to include federal and state estate taxes, citing Jeff ery Estate,
333 Pa. 15, and Brown Estate, 208 Pa. 161. The judge directed that the charities
bear the share of estate taxes applicable to the trust and found further justification
for the decision by reference to the will as a whole and the intention of the testator
to prefer members of his family over the charities.
PART 5-ALPHABETICAL INDEX OF DECISIONS DIGESTED
Estate

Citation

Anderson
Brown
Brown
Brown
Bryant
Constable
Crooks
Croxton
Cunningham
Curtze
Dewart Petition
(Swenk)
Edwards
Ely
Evans
Glatfelter
Greaves
Gredler
Harvey
Haupt
Henlein
Henry
Horn

312 Pa. 180 (1933)
208 Pa. 161 (1904)
59 D. & C. 638 (0. C. of Lacka. County, 1946)
72 D. & C. 399 (0.C. of Del. County, 1948)
315 Pa. 151 (1934)
299 Pa. 509 (1930) and 303 Pa. 567 (1931)
36 D. & C. 58 (0. C. of Lycoming County, 1939)
289 Pa. 433 (1927)
69 D. & C. 579 (0.C. of Lawrence County, 1949)
25 Erie 48 (1943)
16* Northumberland 59 (1946)
56 D. & C. 682 (0. C. of Del. County, 1946)
28 D. & C. 663 (0. C. of Phila. County, 1935)
57 D. & C. 55 (0. C. of Dauphin County, 1945)
60 York 77 (1946)
29 Dist. R. 577 (0. C. of Phila. County, 1920)
31 Erie 464 (1948)
350 Pa. 53 (1944)
57 D. & C. 416 (0.C. of Northampton County, 1946)
26 Erie 13 (1943)
18 D. & C. 667 (0.C. of Lehigh County, 1933)
351 Pa. 131 (1945)
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Estate
Knight
Kyle
Lamberton
Lucey
McCutcheon
McLaughlin
Mack
Magee
Marvin
Miles
Miller
Moreland
Nevil
North
Pitzer
Prifer
Reed
Rettew
Rice
Rieger
Schoen
Slattery
Smith
Spangenberg
Stadtfeld
Stoeckel
Swenk
Tallman
Taylor
Thompson
Uber
Wahr
Wheeler
White
Widener
Williamson
Wood
Wyndham
York
Youngblood

Citation
72 D. & C. 109 (C. P. #3 of Phila. County, 1949)
1 Fid. Rep. 131 (0. C. of Phila. County, 1947)
41 D. & C. 192 (0. C. of Erie County, 1940)
63 D. & C. 645 (0. C. of Phila. County, 1948)
19 D. &C. 131 (0. C. of Phila. County, 1933)
39 D. & C. 573 (0. C. of Phila. County, 1940)
74 D. & C. 385 (0. C. of Allegheny County, 1949)
205 Pa. 37 (1903)
26 D. & C. 527 (0.C. of Montg. County, 1936)
31 Northampton 67 (1947)
59 D. & C. 472 (0.C. of Del. County, 1946)
351 Pa. 623 (1945)
367 Pa. 30 (1951)
50 D. & C. 703 (0.C. of Phila. County, 1944)
62 York 190 (1949)
53 D. & C. 103 (0.C. of Schuylkill County, 1945)
45 D. & C. 628 (0.C. of Montg. County, 1942)
142 Pa. Super. 335 (1940)
65 York 29 (1951)
61 Montg. 104 (1945)
1 Fid. Rep. 113 (0.C. of Phila. County, 1951)
54 D. & C. 542 (0. C. of Montg. County, 1945)
57 Dauph. 351 (1946)
359 Pa. 353 (1948)
359 Pa. 147 (1948)
72 D. & C. 439 (0.C. of Montg. County, 1950)
(Dewart Petition) 16' Northumberland 59, 1946)
10 D. & C. 89 (0.C. of Phila. County, 1928)
48 D. & C. 456 (0.C. of Phila. County, 1943)
64 D. & C. 77 (0. C. of Erie County, 1947)
330 Pa. 417 (1938)
370 Pa. 382 (1952)
25 Erie 113 (1943)
63 D. & C. 408 (0. C. of Phila. County, 1948)
1 Fid. Rep. 126 (0.C. of Montg. County, 1951)
61 Montg. 242 (1945)
48 Lanc. 389 (1943)
1 Fid. Rep. 136 (0.C. of Phila. County, 1949)
75 D. & C. 164 (0.C. of Lehigh County, 1950)
117 Pa. Super. 550 (1935)
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